Colonel Naofuku Mikuni/三国直福 陸軍大佐

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Details.

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Interesting extract from The Nanjing Incident: Japanese Eyewitness Accounts: Testimony from 48 Japanese Who Were There.

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Interview with Colonel Mikuni Naofuku (三国直福), Commander of the 22th Field Artillery Regiment

Mr. Mikuni Naofuku was born in 1893, and when I interviewed him he was 92 years old. He worked at a company in Tokyo until he was 85 years old. He lost his wife when he was 79 years old. Since then, he lived alone. At the age of 85, he quit his job and moved to Chiba where his son lived. I visited him at his home in Chiba. He had a good complexion and looked very healthy. He did, he said, have a little problem with walking, so if he needed to go to Tokyo he goes by car. I visited him three times, we spoke for two hours each time. During the interview he sat on a zabuton cushion with his back straight. I, half his age, couldn’t sit still long and moved my knees restlessly, looking for a comfortable position but Mr. Mikuni didn’t show any sign of fatigue. I admired his attitude and felt guilty for letting him speak for as long as two hours.

Mr. Mikuni had a clear memory and well remembered matters that occurred in Nanjing, including dates. He was working at the Newspaper Unit in the Ministry of the Army and had a great appetite for knowledge about the mass media and for information in general, so he was well informed of current events. He knew what I wanted to hear from him before my visit, so he was prepared to speak in detail.

After serving as Commander of the 22th Field Artillery Regiment, he was appointed as Chief Staff Officer of the 15th Division, then Chief of Nanjing Special Services Agency, and at the time of outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, he served as the Chief of the Research Section of the Ministry of the Army, that is, on the staff of Political Information under Prime Minister Tojo. He met the end of the War in Hanoi, when he was at the time Commander of the 21st Division.

– You went to Nanjing in January 1938.

I arrived in Nanjing on the 15th and stayed until the 22nd. I arrived in the evening of January 15 and on the 22nd, took a boat for my return, so I stayed in Nanjing in total for 6 days.

I visited Division Headquarters the next day to report my return. Divisional Headquarters was located in the splendid buildings of the Nationalist Government. I apologized to the Divisional Commander for my absence due to illness.

– At that time, did you hear anything about disciplinary problem or the Nanjing-Incident at Division Headquarters?

I heard nothing. After I visited the Divisional Commander I went to the Chief of Staff, and I heard nothing there either. When I returned to my job, the 16th Division was planned to move to North China again and, a couple of days later, the Divisional Commander came to our Regiment for an inspection. The inspection took either a half day or all day. I spoke about many things with the Divisional Commander but it was nothing special.

– Did you hear something from lower ranking soldiers in the 22nd Regiment?

Usually, I made a report on officer performance evaluations in December, but I was hospitalized that time so I couldn’t do that, therefore I had to collect information about the battle for Nanjing and other things as soon as I arrived Nanjing. I got a number of reports from subordinates and found no special incidents.

– Did you hear any talk about disciplinary problems from the other divisional commanders or regimental commanders?

I had opportunities to talk to my own Divisional Commander and our Chief of Staff, but rarely with the other divisional commanders and regimental commanders. This was common in the army.

The 16th Division was mobilized in August 1937 and I stayed with the 16th Division until July 1938. On the battlefield, I never met Mr. Noda Kengo (野田謙吾), the Commander of the 33rd Regiment, nor Mr. Sukekawa Seiji (助川静二), Commander of the 38th Regiment. Mr. Noda was a year senior to me and later was substituted by Yamada Kizo (山田喜蔵), who was in the same graduating class as me. I had often shared the same battles with Mr. Katagiri Goro (片桐護郎), the Commander of the 9th Regiment, yet I talked to him in person only a couple of times. And I have no memory of meeting Mr. Oono Noriaki (大野宣明), of the 20th Regiment.

It was same with the Brigade Commanders, I met Mr. Sasaki Toichi (佐々木到一), Commander of the 30th Brigade, only once and Mr. Kusaba Tatsumi (草場辰巳), Commander of the 19th Brigade, more often yet a couple of times at most. And I never heard of the Nanjing-Incident from them.

– Who grasped the Division’s situation as a whole?

I think the Chief of Staff did, Colonel Nakazawa Mitsuo (中沢三夫). After Nanjing, the 16th Division moved to North China again and around Zuzhou they were in continuous battle, for as long as 29 days. During the battle, an adjutant from each Regiment regularly visited the Chief of Staff to receive orders. And the Chief of Staff himself gave them orders. So the Chief of Staff knew everything in the Division. Mr. Nakazawa Mitsuo lived in Fukakusa, Kyoto, and it so happened that his house was one house over from mine. He was a quiet man.

– What was the situation of Nanjing, when you arrived on 15th January?

It was a battlefield so I accepted that. It was wretched and empty. Nevertheless, I felt good because I could catch up with my troops, finally, after my sick leave.

– Were there bodies in the street then?

There might have been, but I didn’t see any. I didn’t have time to make careful observations.

– Did you look around Nanjing City?
Yes. I inspected my subordinates’ battle area. At Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, I received an explanation from an officer who was in charge of observation, and inspected the area for a couple of days. But I didn’t see any bodies that looked like they were the result of a massacre.

– When you headed for North China, you must have left from Xiaguan. What was the situation in Xiaguan?

I don’t remember anything in particular.

– So, among the top officers in the 16th Division, nobody talked about a Nanjing-Incident?

No one did. Not only among top-level soldiers but also lower ranking soldiers, I heard nothing from them. I myself didn’t see anything.

During battle in North China again, I was appointed Chief of Staff of the 15th Division in Nagoya, Japan, and went to Nagoya in July 1938. Later, this Division was ordered to garrison Jiangning (江寧), therefore, I returned to Nanjing in August. Here again, I heard nothing about a massacre. At that time a number of Japanese merchants had already arrived in Nanjing, many from Nagasaki, so we call Nanjing “Nanjing City of Nagasaki Prefecture”. I knew that people couldn’t speak out against the Japanese army but the Nanjing streets atmosphere was very lively.

After that, I served in Nanjing as Chief of Staff of the 15th Division until August 1939, then was appointed to Chief of the Nanjing Special Service Agency and stayed on until May of the next year, 1940. My duty as the Chief of the Special Service Agency was completely different from my past military duties. I had to meet and negotiate with Chinese people every day in order to consider their point of view. So I spoke with Chinese people in town in a friendly manner, but never heard from them about a massacre story.

I met frequently with Mr. Liang Hongzhi (梁鴻志), Premier of the Restoration Government, but I heard nothing from him about a massacre. Mr. Liang Hongzhi was a literary man and I still have his calligrapher which he wrote for me.

– The Chief of Special Service Agency – Captain Onishi Hajime, I think —was also the Chief of the Agency.

Yes, Mr. Onishi replaced Colonel Akiyama Yoshitaka (秋山義隆), then I succeeded Mr. Akiyama.

– Around that time it is said that Mr. Gao Guanwu (高冠吾), the Mayor of Nanjing, buried around 3,000 abandoned bodies found in the suburbs of Nanjing and built a monument.

Is that so? I didn’t know that. Mr. Kokango drank well and we met often but I never heard reproachful words from him.
 
– There were many stories about Divisional Commander Nakajima, what did you think of him?

In short, he was keen and tactful in war. He was an expert in artillery; I had no bad feelings toward him. I was often with him – in 1933 when I became Lieutenant Colonel to the 22nd Regiment of the 16th Division, Lieutenant General Nakajima was the Commander of Maizuru Fortress, Kyoto. The Commander of Maizuru Fortress was under the 16th Division so I met him several times. During a military exercise we stayed at the same local inn for a couple of nights.

At the time of the February 26 Incident in 1936, I was staff officer at the Martial Law Headquarters and later, Mr. Nakajima became Commander of the Military Police. During that time, Mr. Nakajima went to General Ugaki Kazushige (宇垣一成) to stop him to form a cabinet–that was so well-known a story. I think it happened that Mr. Nakajima was in the position to do the job; it was a turn of fate.

In December of the same year, 1936, I was appointed Commander of the 22nd Field Artillery Regiment and in August 1937, the next year, I received Mr. Nakajima, who became Divisional Commander. As I received Divisional Commander Nakajima, he asked me about the field artillery regiment in detail. I had 8 months experience as the Regiment Commander and when I mentioned that he said, “Only 8 months, so you know nothing. OK, don’t worry, I will teach you.”

Less than a month later, our regiment was scheduled for live fire exercise in Aibano, Shiga, so, on the night before we expected the Divisional Commander’s inspection. The next day, we were suddenly ordered to mobilize. I stopped the training schedule and hurried to Division Headquarters. It was 3 o’clock in the morning, August 25.
The Divisional Commander was there, he saw my tensed face and said, “Artillery man, don’t worry.” I was touched.

Divisional Commander Nakajima was very devoted on battlefield, I was surprised that in North China, the Divisional Commander himself moved ahead to the front of the line.
Those days I left all shooting matters to the chief of the company. The Divisional Commander asked the company commander to “Show me the target lists,” and asked many questions and gave instructions. It so happened that the company commander had just completed his training at artillery school, so he could answer all of his questions; I felt relieved.

During the moving from North China to Central China, the Divisional Commander instructed us to do live fire training whenever we had leisure time. We had once done a complete live fire exercise – all 12 companies laid out before the Divisional Commander. Divisional Commander Nakajima was well-known as an expert in artillery–he was really devoted. In the attack on Nanjing, he moved to the frontline artillery base and got injured.

I went to Nanjing to return to my duty after the attack on Nanjing was completed. The Divisional Commander scolded me, “The shooting performance by the 22nd Field Artillery Regiment was terrible.” He was expert in artillery–that’s why he was not satisfied with our performance.

He paid attention to details on operations, so some infantry regimental commanders complained about this – in a favorable view he was a very attentive person, and in an unfavorable view he was a meticulous person.

On the other hand, Divisional Commander Nakajima had a sensitive aspect. In Shunde (順徳), which was located in north China, a superior of a soldier showed me a letter which was sent to the soldier in my regiment from his mother in which the soldier’s mother worried for her son, from the beginning to the end. I showed the letter to Commander Nakajima, he read it and shed many tears.

And during the battle at Taierzhuang (台児荘), when a transportation corps was in trouble due to the loss of their horses, the Divisional Commander himself came to me asking to give some of the artillery units’ horses to the transportation corps. We were running low on artillery shells so our load was lighter, so I made our horses 6-in-hand to 4-in-hand and managed to give some of our horses to the transportation corps. Soon the Divisional Commander came to me again and said that the transportation corps was very pleased.

He cared for me as well. I have a hemorrhoid problem and during the training he worried about my problem in a friendly manner. After a battle in Xuzhou, I got a message tube, thrown from a plane, in which I was ordered to be the Chief of Staff of the 15th Division. Therefore, after the battle was settled, I went to Divisional Commander Nakajima to report that I was leaving my current position. He told me then, “Mr. Mikuni is a man of sentiment, rather than rationality.” I thought surely this applied to Divisional Commander Nakajima.

–Both you and Divisional Commander Nakajima were artillerymen, his demands were high, nevertheless, there was understanding between each other, I suppose?

That was one reason. But there was another reason: commanders of artillery regiments and military engineers regiments must stay near the Divisional Commander– that was a rule. In case of the 16th Division, the brigade commanders and commanders of infantry regiments deployed far away so they could communicate only via radio. On the other hand I was always with the Divisional Commander. I think I was most near to him.

The Chief of Staff was always busy issuing orders and plans, and the Divisional Commander was often alone so I acted something like a conversationalist or entertainment. For this performance, Chief of Staff Nakazawa, greatly appreciated that. Also, the senior adjutant, whose duty was to serve the Divisional Commander, was in the same graduating class as me, told me often enough, “You helped my job a lot.”

– It is said that General Matsui criticized the Divisional Commander’s command in Nanjing.

As I mentioned earlier, the Lieutenant General was very keen in battle. His main concern was battle. And for a person in the position of lieutenant general, he handled matters of detail himself so people thought every result was attributed to him.

Generally speaking – around 1913, when I graduated from the Military Academy– “Depend on the enemy for food” and “Only reasonable number of prisoners” were commonly stated so I cannot deny those rough ideas existed.

– What kind of person was Brigade Commander Sasaki, who served as the Commander of the Nanjing Garrison?

As you know, he was an expert of China. I first met him at the Jinan (済南) Incident, 1928. In Jinan, the Japanese 6th Division and Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition, clashed. I was working with the newspaper team in the Ministry of the Army then and was ordered to join the 6th Division immediately. Lieutenant General Sasaki was in Nanjing then and he came to Jinan together with Chiang Kai-shek. In those days, Lieutenant General Sasaki had very friendly relationship with Chiang Kai-shek and he was posted in Nanjing as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Later 1937, the Lieutenant General came to Nanjing again and that time he was in the position to attack Chiang Kai-shek. I wonder what he felt then.

While I was in the 16th Division, I had hardly opportunities to speak with Brigadier General Sasaki.

– General Matsui was sentenced to death at the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE) and executed, due to the Nanjing Trials.

The War Trial was problematic. When the War ended, I was in Hanoi where I was about to leave by ship, but I was forced off the ship by a US military officer. Then, Chief of Staff Shishido (宍戸) and I were brought to Canton and charged as war criminals. The trial then was totally unreasonable, I was charged with creating the “puppet government” of Wang Zhaoming (汪兆銘), and that my soldiers used violence against civilians. Yes, I served as the Chief of Special Service Agency in Nanjing when the Wang Government was established but I was not deeply involved with them. Concerning the violence of my soldiers, my Division was involved in almost no battles and was strictly warned about discipline and so we had no problems at all. As a matter of fact, I awarded branch units for their good behavior.

When I was accused of using violence against civilians, I demanded for them to show evidence. They brought me a file as evidence, in which I found statements from people who were ordered by the Chinese army to make statements. In the file, the order of the statements was left as is–the dates shown in the file were of the lunar calendar and places and dates hardly matched that of the Division’s movements. That was the extent of the Chinese “evidence”.

Also, in some trials there was neither a prosecutor nor an attorney. I heard that in a determination of the death sentence, the defendant’s appearance played an important role. I don’t know how the sentence and personal looks are related.

It was rumored that I would get a death sentence but I protested against every accusation. My trial was set towards the end but in the earlier trials, there so many people sentenced death, so beginning with the person tried before me, they handed out life imprisonment sentences and I got a sentence of life imprisonment, too. I was imprisoned in Canton for two years, then in a Shanghai prison for one–and-a-half years, and furthermore in Sugamo Prison for three-and-a-half years, until 1952.

That was how war trials were conducted by China after the War.

– When did you learn about the Nanjing-Incident?

After I was released from Sugamo Prison. But I knew that General Matsui had been executed, maybe I heard the news in prison in Shanghai. There were Chinese newspapers and someone who could read Chinese told me about it.
 
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